Surgical Search:  Removing a Scar on the Fourth Amendment by Mandell, Leonard Bruce & Richardson, L. Anita
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 75
Issue 3 Fall Article 1
Fall 1984




Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Criminal Law is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Leonard Bruce Mandell, L. Anita Richardson, Surgical Search: Removing a Scar on the Fourth Amendment, 75 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 525 (1984)
0091-4169/84/7503-525
THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY Vol. 75, No. 3
Copyright @ 1984 by Northwestern University School of Law Printed in U.S.A.
SURGICAL SEARCH: REMOVING A SCAR




Court-ordered surgical removal of a bullet from the body of a
criminal suspect' poses serious problems both for law enforcement
officials and the judicial system when analyzed under the fourth
amendment prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures.2 As
with any search and seizure issue, the threshold determination is the
reasonableness or unreasonableness of the proposed search.3 The
courts must establish the line between reasonable and unreasonable
searches. This task of line-drawing is significant given that surgical
searches are involuntary,4 painful,5 and may constitute potentially
* Assistant Dean, College of Law, Northern Illinois University; J.D., Boston College
Law School, 1976; B.A., University of Connecticut, 1972.
** Class of 1985, College of Law, Northern Illinois University; Ph.D., University of
Nebraska, 1975; M.A., University of Nebraska, 1973; B.A., University of Missouri-Kansas
City, 1971.
1 The term surgical search will be used throughout this paper as a shorthand term
summarizing the surgical removal of one or more bullets, under either local or general
anesthetic, from the body of a defendant in a criminal case.
2 As with all searches and seizures, surgical searches are conducted to recover evi-
dence to be used in a criminal prosecution. In each of the cases surveyed in Part II, see
infra notes 23-62 and accompanying text, the prosecution was seeking one or more bul-
lets, embedded within the body of the suspect, intending to submit the bullet into evi-
dence against him.
3 The fourth amendment does not preclude all searches and seizures, only those
searches and seizures judicially determined to be unreasonable:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue but upon probable cause supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
Regarding the scope of the fourth amendment, the Supreme Court has noted that
"the [f]ourth [a]mendment's proper function is to constrain, not against all intrusions as
such, but against intrusions which are not justified in the circumstances, or which are
made in an improper manner." Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768 (1966).
4 All of the surgical search cases to date have involved nonconsenting defendants.
The authors are not aware of any surgical searches performed pursuant to the defend-
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dangerous intrusions6 into the body of an individual presumed in-
nocent by the very criminal justice system seeking to "break into the
privacy"7 of his physical being.
The uniquely intrusive nature of surgical searches is itself am-
ple support for serious reflection by the legal system. The need for
such reflection is enhanced when the issue of surgical searches is
placed within the context of the expansive ambit of permissible, rea-
sonable searches currently allowed under the fourth amendment.
The Supreme Court has let stand, in the face of fourth amendment
challenges, the following types of searches: stop-and-frisk searches;8
wiretapping; 9 recorded eavesdropping; 10 monitoring personal use
of a private telephone;" use of electronic tracking devices (viz.
"beepers");' 2 handwriting exemplars; t3 voice exemplars;' 4 scrap-
ant's consent. The constitutional problem would differ considerably from the one ad-
dressed here should the situation involve a defendant who initially consents to a surgical
search, objecting only after the bullet is removed. Such a subsequent constitutional
challenge would most likely be directed to the constitutionality of the consent. In all
likelihood, the challenge would be predicated on an alleged violation of the defendant's
fourteenth amendment procedural due process rights rather than on an alleged viola-
tion of the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.
5 Surgeries clearly vary in the level of pain experienced by the patient. In this con-
text, the reader should note that pain is associated with surgeries performed under local
anesthesia. See, e.g., Lee v. Winston, 717 F.2d 888, 905 (4th Cir. 1983) (Widener, J.,
dissenting), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1906 (1984); United States v. Crowder, 543 F.2d 312,
321 n.32 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Robinson, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977).
6 The fourth amendment bright line regulating surgical searches is grounded in ju-
dicial concern about the differences in the extent of bodily intrusion and any resultant
differential risk between surgical removal of bullets under local anesthetic and surgical
removal under general anesthetic. See infra notes 21, 34, 46, 57, 83 and accompanying
text; see generally infra notes 63-106 and accompanying text.
7 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
8 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
9 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 354-56 (1967) (holding wire tapping pur-
suant to warrant constitutes reasonable search and seizure under fourth amendment).
10 See United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 750 (1979) (finding no fourth amend-
ment violation where conversations were intercepted by and recorded from radio trans-
mitter worn by IRS agent proceeding in violation of IRS policy regarding
eavesdropping); White v. United States, 401 U.S. 745, 751 (1971) (holding no fourth
amendment violation where conversations were intercepted by and recorded from radio
transmitter worn by law enforcement agent proceeding in absence of warrant).
I See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979) (holding warrantless use of
pen-register, a monitoring device attached to telephone line that records numbers of all
outgoing calls, did not constitute a search within meaning of fourth amendment and did
not violate fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures).
12 See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983) (holding use of electronic
"beeper" tracking device to monitor movement of drum of chloroform was not a search
within meaning of fourth amendment and did not violate fourth amendment protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures).
13 See United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 22 (1973).
14 See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 15 (1973).
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ings from fingernails; 15 bloodtests;' 6 and body-cavity; 17 searches.' 8
These cases illustrate a clear, progressive movement into the
physical being of the person, which had been thought to be pro-
tected by a constitutionally recognized zone of privacy. 19 It is this
progressive expansion of what constitutes a reasonable search that
requires a thoughtful analysis of surgical searches. Do surgical
searches represent one further step in a shrinking zone of fourth
amendment privacy? Or, do surgical searches represent the limit of
reasonableness under the fourth amendment, establishing with firm-
ness an inviolate zone of privacy?
This Article will review the major surgical, search cases and
demonstrate that the courts considering the question of surgical
searches draw a bright line between those surgical searches that are
to be performed under a local anesthetic and those" that are to be
performed under a general anesthetic. Those surgical searches to
be performed under local anesthetic are held to be reasonable surgi-
cal searches under the fourth amendment 20 ' . Those surgical
searches to' be performed under general anestheti' are held to be
unreasonable. 2' This Article will give particular attention to Lee v.
15 See Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296 (1973). Similar search and seizures have
been held constitutional in the face of fourth amendment challenges. See, e.g., United
States v. Smith, 470 F.2d 377, 380 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (penile. swab of arrestee); Brent v.
White, 398 F.2d 503, 505 (5th Cir. 1968) (penile tissue scraping" from arrestee), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1123 (1969) (the ChiefJustice andJustice Douglas voting to grant certi-
orari on the basis of their dissents in Schmerber); United States px'rel Parson v. Anderson,
354 F. Supp. 1060, 1087 (D. Del. 1972) (pubic hair sample from'prisoner), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1072 (1973); Ewing v. State, 160 Ind. App. 138, 147-48, 310 N.E.2d 571, 578-
79 (1974),(urine sample from probationer).
16 See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,,771 (1965).
17 See United States v. Shields, 453 F.2d'1235 (9th Cir. 1972) (holding body cavity
search permissible 'where there exists clear indication or plain suggestion of presence of
concealed contraband), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972); Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d
703 (9th Cir. 1966) (same holding as in Shields), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 945 (1967).
18 The constitutionality of strip searches has not been ruled'upon directly by the
Supreme Court. See Illinois v. Lafayette, 103 S. Ct. 2605, 2609 n.2 (1983) (holding
search of arrestee's shoulder bag permissible where it constitutes routine procedure
prior to incarceration, but noting that Court was not addressing circumstances in which
strip searches would be appropriate).
19 See infra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
20 See Crowder, 543 F.2d at 312; Hughes v. United States, 429 A.2d 1339 (D.C. 1981);
Doe v. State, 409 So. 2d 25 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Creamei'v. State, 229 Ga. 511,
192 S.E.2d 350 (1972); State v. Lawson, 187 N.J. Super. 25, 453 A.2d 556 (1982); State
v. Allen, 277 S.C. 595, 291 S.E.2d 459 (1982). See also State v. Martin, 404 So. 2d 960
(La. 1981) (approving state's request to appoint panel of doctors to examine feasibility
of removing bullet from defendant's head where unknown at time whether anesthetic
would be localor not).
21 See Bowdert v. State, 256 Ark. 820, 510 S.W.2d 879 (1974); State v. Overstreet,
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551 S.W.2d 621 (Mo. 1977); People v. Smith, 80 Misc. 2d 210, 362 N.Y.S.2d 909 (Sup.
Ct. 1974).
Courts have simplified the complexities of anesthesia by utilizing the distinction
between local and general anesthesia. This distinction may facilitate the initial framing
of legal issues when they are posed by a case of first impression. In such a context,
dichotomizing local and general anesthesia can be a valid point of departure. This may,
however, direct attention away from other legal concerns that could be raised with re-
spect to surgical searches. These concerns relate to (a) whether or not the legal issues
vary with the use of each type of anesthesia, (b) the range of anesthesia that can be
induced by both local and general anesthetics, (c) the manner of anesthetic induction,
and (d) the relative risk of local and general anesthesia, an issue considered at greater
length at infra notes 83-84 and accompanying text. Thus, it is important to be aware of
distinctions that may be missed by the shorthand use of the medical terms local and
general anesthesia.
Local anesthesia is anesthesia that reduces or eliminates the perception of pain
without affecting consciousness. Local anesthesia is categorized as (1) local infiltration
anesthesia, injection of anesthesia directly into the operative site, and (2) regional (also
known as conductive) anesthesia, anesthesia affecting an entire structural-functional
area of the body by injection directed to the nerve(s) serving the surgical site. Another
form of local anesthesia, topical anesthesia, is inapplicable to surgical searches because
it is used only to anesthetize mucous tissue, e.g., eyes, nose, throat, urethra, and is ap-
plied directly to mucous tissue. See R. GRAY & L. GORDY, ATrORNEY'S TExTBooK OF
MEDICINE §§ 58.50-.51(1)-(3) (3d ed. 1983); LAWYER'S MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA OF PER-
SONAL INJURIES AND ALLIED SPECIAL-IES §§ 25.26-.31 (3d ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as
LAWYER'S MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA]. See also R. DRIPPSJ. ECKENHOFF & L. VANDAM, INTRo-
DUCTION TO ANESTHESIA 242-308 (1977) (pt. C: Regional Anesthesia).
Both local infiltration and regional anesthesia, by definition, desensitize the area
surrounding the site of surgery. LAWYER'S MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA, supra, at § 25.26. Both
local infiltration and regional anesthesia are induced by pharmacological local anesthet-
ics. R. GRAY & L. GORDY, supra, at §§ 58.51(1)-.51(3b); LAWYER'S MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA,
supra, at §§ 25.28-.31. There are, however, significant differences between local infiltra-
tion and regional anesthesia in the mode of induction and in the types of operations that
can be performed under each. To illustrate, local infiltration use of local anesthesia
desensitizes the peripheral nerves of only a delimited area of the body and is induced by
a direct injection into and around the surgical site. R. GRAY & L. GORDY, supra, at
§ 58.5 1(1); LAWYER'S MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA, supra, at § 25.28. Regional use of local an-
esthesia desensitizes a much larger area of the body, however, the entire area served by
the nerve(s) selected for desensitization. This type of local anesthesia is delivered by an
injection: (1) at the base of the nerve(s) to be desensitized; (2) into the epidural space;
or (3) into the cerebrospinal fluid. R. DRIPPS, J. ECKENHOFF & L. VANDAM, supra, at pt.
C; R. GRAY & L. GORDY, supra, at § 58.51(3); LAWYER'S MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA, supra, at
§§ 25.29-.31. Thus, local anesthesia can be used as a nerve block in the facial area,
cervical (neck) area, upper rib and clavicle (collar bone) area, etc. R. DRIPPS, J. ECK-
ENHOFF & L. VANDAM, supra, at ch. 20; LAWYER'S MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA, supra, at § 25.28.
Local anesthesia may be employed to desensitize an entire structural-functional re-
gion, for example, the thoracic region (the thoracic or upper chest area); the caudal-
sacral region (the area encompassing the inner thighs, anus, rectum, and genitalia); or
the lumbar region (the lower abdominal and pelvic area). R. DRIPPSJ. ECKENHOFF & L.
VANDAM, supra, at ch. 19; R. GRAY & L. GORDY, supra, at § 58.51(3a). There are two
modes of induction for this use of local anesthesia. One mode is via injection into the
epidural space: the space between the covering of the spinal cord and the bony canal
formed by vertebrae. In this mode of induction, nerve(s) are affected after exiting the
covering of the spinal cord. R. DRIPPS, J. ECKENHOFF & L. VANDAM, supra, at ch. 19; R.
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GRAY & L. GORDY, supra, at § 58.51(3a); LAWYER'S MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA, supra, at
§ 25.31.
The second mode of induction is by injection of local anesthesia into the cerebro-
spinal fluid so that nerves are affected at the point of exiting the spinal cord. Local
anesthesia, used as spinal anesthesia, can, depending on concentration, affect all nerve
groups below the diaphragm and above the sacrum (the large bone at the base of the
spine). R. DRIPPS, J. ECKENHOFF & L. VANDAM, supra, at ch.18; R. GRAY & L. GORDY,
supra, at § 58.51(3b); LAWYER'S MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA, supra, at § 25.30. In addition, spi-
nal use of local anesthesia affects the autonomic nervous system, the nervous system that
is involved in regulating the heart, blood pressure, respiration, body temperature, the
so-called fight-or-flight response, and behavior and emotional functioning.
Although all of the above-outlined anesthetic procedures deliver local anesthesia
and affect only certain areas of the body, there are major differences between local infil-
tration and regional anesthesia. Thus, under regional, but not local infiltration, local
anesthesia, major surgical procedures can be performed, such as a full range of abdomi-
nal surgeries. R. GRAY & L. GORDv, supra, at § 58.51(3); LAWYER'S MEDICAL
CYCLOPEDIA, supra, at § 25.31.
The legal concept of major and minor bodily intrusions, employed to distinguish
between surgical searches performed under general and local anesthesia, obscures legal
cognizance of the extent of bodily intrusions possible under local anesthesia. see Schmer-
ber, 384 U.S. at 771 (leaving open question whether "fear," "health," or "religious
scruples" might render a minor procedure too intrusive); see also infra notes 23-62 and
accompanying text. It is clear that both major and minor intrusions can and do occur
under local anesthesia. See infra notes 107-120 and accompanying text.
The same blurring of legally significant distinctions occurs in the undifferentiated
use of the term general anesthesia by courts considering surgical search cases. Such
undifferentiated use focuses attention on the perceived life-threatening dangers of un-
consciousness induced by general anesthesia, obscuring the medical fact that there are
degrees of surgical unconsciousness, only two of which pose the life-threatening dan-
gers usually evoked by the term general anesthesia. See R. DRIPPS, J. ECKENHOFF & L.
VANDAM, supra, at 232-36; R. GRAY & L. GORDY, supra, at §§ 58.70-.74. Indeed, although
general anesthesia can be life-threatening, it is not usually so. Thus, surgeries per-
formed under general anesthesia are performed at a stage that is not life-threatening.
See R. DRIPPS, J. ECKENHOFF & L. VANDAM, supra, at 234-35; R. GRAY & L. GORDY, supra,
at § 58.73. Furthermore, little or no legal cognizance is accorded to the medical fact
that minor as well as major surgical procedures are performed under general anesthesia.
See R. GRAY & L. GORDY, supra, at § 58.52. Indeed, use of general anesthesia for minor
surgery facilitates the surgery and minimizes the damage to nerves, muscles, and blood
vessels. This is the case because of the body's relaxed state under general anesthesia,
which permits the surgeon to move these structures out- of the way rather than cut
through them, as would be the case with local anesthesia. See infra note 84.
The conclusion is that the use of local versus general anesthesia does not necessa-
rily identify minor versus major bodily intrusions and, hence, is not a legally valid system
of categorizing such intrusions. Yet, the courts hearing surgical search cases have made
such an identification, obscuring the central legal issue of when a surgical search ceases
to be reasonable. See infra notes 44, 66 and accompanying text.
Some surgical searches may be reasonable under the fourth amendment. See infra
notes 107-120 and accompanying text. If a surgical search ceases to be reasonable when
the bodily intrusion entailed in the search is major, such an intrusion cannot be mea-
sured by the type of anesthesia to be utilized because major intrusions can occur with
certain uses of local anesthesia as well as with the use of general anesthesia. Thus, if the
use of general anesthesia is to function as the bright line separating reasonable from
unreasonable searches, its underlying rationale cannot be wedded to the extent and as-
sociated risks of the bodily intrusion.
A final point, considered more fully at infra note 83, is the relative risk associated
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Winston,22 the most recent appellate court decision drawing the
bright line against the use of general anesthesia to perform a surgi-
cal search. In examining the development of the bright line prohibi-
tion of general anesthesia in surgical search cases, this Article will
examine the principal legal rationales supporting this prohibition.
Closing remarks will articulate proposed rules applicable to the
fourth amendment analysis of the use of both general and local an-
esthetic surgical searches.
II. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT: THE ROCHIN AND SCHMERBER
STANDARDS
The United States Supreme Court has not directly addressed
the constitutionality of surgical searches. In Rochin v. California
23
and Schmerber v. California,24 however, the Court did address the con-
stitutionality of bodily intrusive searches conducted to secure evi-
dence for subsequent prosecutions. In Rochin,25 the Court held that
pumping the stomach of the defendant without his consent, in order
to recover swallowed evidence, was an unconstitutional bodily intru-
sion. 26 In Schmerber,27 the Court found the challenged bodily intru-
with local and general anesthesia. Medically, risk is associated with the condition of the
patient, not with the principal anesthesia employed-local or general. The healthier the
patient, the lower the risk, regardless of the use of general or local anesthesia. R.
DRIPPS, J. ECKENHOFF & L. VANDAM, supra, at 14-15.
22 Lee v. Winston, 717 F.2d 888 (4th Cir. 1983), aff'g 551 F. Supp. 247 (E.D. Va.
1982), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1906 (1984).
23 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
24 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
25 342 U.S. at 165. In Rochin, three deputy sheriffs, acting on "information that
[Rochin] was selling narcotics," entered Rochin's home and located him in a bedroom.
Id. at 166. On a table adjacent to the bed, the deputies noticed two capsules. When the
deputies inquired about their contents, Rochin placed them in his mouth and eventually
swallowed them. Id. The deputies immediately seized Rochin and physically attempted
to extricate the capsules from his mouth. When their efforts failed, the deputies trans-
ported Rochin to a hospital and, without his consent, had his stomach pumped. Id.
Analysis of the contents of Rochin's stomach revealed the presence of morphine. The
morphine so obtained constituted the principal evidence for his conviction. Id. at 166-
67.
26 Rochin was decided on fourteenth amendment procedural due process grounds,
rather than on fourth amendment unreasonable search and seizure grounds. See Rochin,
342 U.S. at 168-69, 174. The Rochin decision was rendered before the fourth amend-
ment had been applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment. See Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 26-27 (1949). Even though the standard of review applied in
Rochin was the "concept of ordered liberty," Rochin, 342 U.S. at 169 (quoting Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)), the :'shocks the conscience" and "rack and
screw" approach, see infra notes 38-39 and accompanying text, has been converted into a
standard of review by many of the courts hearing cases on surgical searches that have
been challenged as unreasonable under the fourth amendment. See, e.g., Lee v. Win-
ston, 717 F.2d 888, 901 (4th Cir. 1983) [hereinafter cited as Lee II], cert. granted, 104 S.
Ct. 1906 (1984); United States v. Crowder, 543 F.2d 312, 316 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert.
[Vol. 75530
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sion-involuntary withdrawal of blood used to ascertain its blood-
alcohol content 2 8- constitutional.
29
Rochin and Schmerber are the only Supreme Court cases available
to guide lower federal courts and state courts faced with the issue of
whether or not surgical bodily intrusions are permissible when chal-
lenged as violative of the fourth amendment prohibition against un-
denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977); Lee v. Winston, 551 F. Supp. 247, 259-61 (E.D. Va. 1982)
[hereinafter cited as Lee I], aff'd, 717 F.2d 888 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct.
1906 (1984); Bowden v. State, 256 Ark. 820, 822, 510 S.W.2d 879, 880 (1974); Adams
v. State, 260 Ind. 663, 666, 299 N.E.2d 834, 836 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974);
State v. Richards, 585 S.W.2d 505, 506 (Mo. 1979); State v. Lawson, 187 N.J. Super.
25, 29, 453 A.2d 556, 558 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982); State v. Allen, 277 S.C. 595, 597,
291 S.E.2d 459, 460 (1982).
27 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 757.
28 In Schmerber, defendant-appellant Schmerber, along with a companion, had been
drinking at a "tavern and bowling alley." Upon leaving, Schmerber and his companion
got into a car with Schmerber driving. The automobile "skidded, crossed the road, and
struck a tree." Id. at 758 n.2. Schmerber was taken to a hospital and treated for injuries
sustained in the accident.
A policeman who investigated the accident both at the scene and at the hospital
later testified that Schmerber's breath smelled of alcohol and that his eyes "were 'blood-
shot, watery, sort of glassy in appearance.'" Id. at 768-69. The officer arrested Schmer-
ber at the hospital and ordered the attending physician to withdraw blood for analysis of
its blood-alcohol content. Id. at 758. Schmerber did not consent to the blood test. The
subsequent blood analysis indicated that Schmerber was intoxicated at the time of the
accident. A report of the analysis was admitted into evidence at Schmerber's trial. Id. at
759.
29 The defendant-appellant in Schmerber claimed four specific constitutional viola-
tions: procedural due process under the fourteenth amendment; self-incrimination
under the fifth amendment; right to counsel under the sixth amendment; and unreason-
able search and seizure under the fourth amendment. The Court held that the involun-
tary withdrawal of Schmerber's blood in order to ascertain its blood-alcohol content was
permissible under each of the constitutional provisions alleged to have been violated. Id.
at 771-72. The Court's holding on the search and seizure claim is of principal signifi-
cance because it formulated the basic structure of what has become the standard of re-
view for surgical searches. See Lee II, 717 F.2d at 899, 901; Crowder, 543 F.2d at 316;
Hughes v. United States, 429 A.2d 1339, 1340 (D.C. 1981); Doe v. State, 409 So. 2d 25,
26-27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Creamer v. State, 229 Ga. 511, 514, 192 S.E.2d 350,
352-53 (1972); Richards, 585 S.W.2d at 506; Lawson, 187 N.J. Super. at 28-29, 453 A.2d
at 558; Allen, 277 S.C. at 602-03, 291 S.E.2d at 463.
Courts finding surgical searches unreasonable have utilized the Schmerber opinion as
the operative standard of review, either standing alone or in conjunction with the Rochin
standard of review. See Bowden, 256 Ark. at 822-23, 510 S.W.2d at 881; Smith, 80 Misc.
2d at 215, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 913-14 (1974); Allen, 277 S.C. at 597, 291 S.E.2d at 460-61.
The Schmerber Court defined a minor bodily intrusion as one that "involves virtually
no risk, trauma, or pain." Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771. A minor bodily intrusion must be
performed "by a physician in a hospital environment according to accepted medical
practices." Id. The Court clearly identified the circumstances that would justify a minor
bodily intrusive search: there must be "a clear indication that in fact [desired] evidence
will be found." Id. at 770. The Court closed its opinion with an affirmation of the value
accorded by our culture to the "integrity of an individual's person," noting that its deci-
sion must not be construed as countenancing "more substantial intrusions or intrusions
under other conditions." Id. at 772.
1984]
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reasonable searches and seizures. 30 All courts considering the
constitutionality of surgical searches have taken Rochin and Schmerber
as their analytical base, relying on one or both in reaching their
decisions.
8 '
A court compares the facts of a given case to both Rochin and
Schmerber.32 If the case approximates Rochin, the surgical search is
held unreasonable. 33 If it falls within the parameters of Schmerber,
one of two outcomes is possible. If the surgical search is deemed a
minor bodily intrusion, it is held reasonable.3 4 If the surgical search is
deemed to constitute a major bodily intrusion, it is held to be
unreasonable.3
5
The Court in Rochin, applying the concept of ordered liberty as
30 See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
31 See supra notes 26 & 29.
32 See Lee II, 717 F.2d at 899; Crowder, 543 F.2d at 316; Lee 1, 551 F. Supp. at 259-61;
Bowden, 256 Ark. at 822-23, 510 S.W.2d at 879-80; Doe, 409 So. 2d at 27-28; Adams, 260
Ind. at 666-68, 299 N.E.2d at 836-37; Overstreet, 551 S.W.2d at 625, 627-28; Lawson, 187
NJ. Super. at 29, 453 A.2d at 558; Smith, 80 Misc. 2d at 214, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 912-13;
Allen, 277 S.C. at 597, 291 S.E.2d at 460-61.
33 See Lee 11, 717 F.2d at 901 ("the procedure contemplated is more akin to the im-
permissible activity of Rochin than to the minor intrusion in Schmerber. In short '[t]hese
are methods too close to the rack and screw to permit of constitutional differentia-
tion.' ") (quoting Lee 1, 551 F. Supp. at 261); Adams, 260 Ind. at 666, 299 N.E.2d at 836
(court found Rochin opinion controlling); Smith, 80 Misc. 2d at 215, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 914
("the use of the surgical knife to the extent indicated in this case is offensive to the sense
of fair play and decency and the American way of life").
34 See Crowder, 543 F.2d at 316. The court in Crowder explicitly rejected the Rochin
standard, adopting the basic Schmerber standard but incorporating additional safeguards.
See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
It is important to note that the Crowder opinion substantially expanded the proce-
dural requirements established by the Supreme Court in Schmerber to secure a surgical
search. The court in Crowder required an adversarial hearing on the propriety of the
surgical search itself and appellate review prior to execution of the surgical search. The
Schmerber standard, as expanded by the Crowder opinion, constitutes what can be termed
the Schmerber-Crowder standard. It has been utilized in three surgical search cases. See
Richards, 585 S.W.2d at 506; Overstreet, 551 S.W.2d at 626-27; Lawson, 187 NJ. Super. at
28-29, 453 A.2d at 558-59. See also Doe, 409 So. 2d at 27 (court, applying Schmerber and
also citing Crowder, held "mere chance" of bullet's evidentiary value rendered search
unreasonable); Allen, 277 S.C. at 603, 291 S.E.2d at 463 (court, applying Schmerber stan-
dard, held proposed surgical search of first defendant unreasonable under fourth
amendment because it "involv[ed] a substantial intrusion into his body and risk to his
health, safety or life" and upheld proposed surgical search of second defendant as minor
bodily intrusion).
35 See Bowden, 256 Ark. at 823-24, 510 S.W.2d at 881 ("the proposed operation con-
stitutes medically a major intrusion into petitioner's body involving trauma, pain and
possible risk of life even when performed in a proper medical environment with the
most careful and skilled attention"); Overstreet, 551 S.W.2d at 626-27 (judicial delegation
of determination of reasonableness to surgeon evaluating risks fails Schmerber test); Allen,
277 S.C. at 603, 291 S.E.2d at 463 (major surgery for bullet removal "involving a sub-




its standard of review,3 6 held that the legally unauthorized3 7 pump-
ing of the defendant-appellant's stomach constituted
conduct that shocks the conscience. Illegally breaking into the privacy of the
petitioner, the struggle to open his mouth and remove what was there,
the forcible extraction of his stomach's contents-this course of pro-
ceeding by agents of government to obtain evidence is bound to of-
fend even hardened sensibilities. They are methods too close to the rack and
screw to permit of constitutional differentiation.
38
The ideas expressed in this passage have been employed as a stand-
ard by courts hearing or reviewing surgical searches.3 9 Rochin and its
language have expressly been invoked by all courts holding surgical
searches unreasonable under the fourth amendment.
40
The Court, in its Schmerber opinion, utilized different language
to validate the bodily intrusion caused by an involuntarily adminis-
tered blood test. The Schmerber decision focused less on the circum-
stances of the bodily intrusion, as was the case in Rochin, and more
on the impact of the intrusion on the defendant. The Court held
that a blood test constituted a reasonable search under the fourth
amendment because it was a minor bodily intrusion "involv[ing] vir-
tually no risk, trauma, or pain . . .[when] performed in a reason-
able manner. . . by a physician in a hospital environment according
to accepted medical practices."'4 ' From this language, the minor-
major intrusion standard of review has evolved and has been em-
ployed by all courts that have validated surgical searches challenged
as unreasonable under the fourth amendment.
4 2
The standards of review that have evolved from the Court's lan-
guage in both Rochin and Schmerber appear to acknowledge the sanc-
tity of the defendant's body, 43 and to recognize the dilemma posed
36 Rochin, 342 U.S. at 169.
37 See supra note 26.
38 Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172 (emphasis supplied).
39 See Lee II, 717 F.2d at 901; Crowder, 543 F.2d at 316; Bowden, 256 Ark. at 823, 510
S.W.2d at 880; Adams, 260 Ind. at 666, 299 N.E.2d at 836; Richards, 585 S.W.2d at 506;
Lawson, 187 NJ. Super. at 29, 453 A.2d at 558; Smith, 80 Misc. 2d at 214, 362 N.Y.S.2d
at 913; Allen, 277 S.C. at 597, 291 S.E.2d at 460.
40 See supra note 33.
41 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771. The Schmerber Court construed the challenged blood
test as a minor bodily intrusion based on the application of the following two-step stand-
ard of review: (1) justification considered in terms of a clear indication that specific, de-
sired evidence is contained within the body; and (2) reasonable procedures for securing the
evidence as defined by "accepted medical practices." Id. at 768, 770-71. See also supra
note 28.
42 See Crowder, 543 F.2d at 316; Hughes, 429 A.2d 1339, 1340; Doe, 409 So. 2d at 28;
Creamer, 229 Ga. at 514-15, 192 S.E.2d at 351; Richards, 585 S.W.2d at 506; Lawson, 187
N.J. Super. at 29, 453 A.2d at 559; Allen, 277 S.C. at 603, 291 S.E.2d at 463.
43 See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769-70, 772 (noting that fourth amendment precludes
unreasonable searches and seizures in order to protect "[tihe interests in human dignity
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by permitting bodily intrusive searches that, by definition, violate
the body's sanctity. This dilemma is framed even more starkly by
surgical searches.
Surgical searches are per se intrusive. The functional nature of
the surgical scalpel is to intrude, by incision, into the body. It does
so whatever its articulated purpose-to heal or to seek evidence of
guilt. And, although its intrusive nature may be mitigated by the
consent of the patient or judicial supervision, it remains intrusive.
44
The sanctity of the body, however, is not the only value to be
considered in assessing the reasonableness of bodily intrusive
searches. The Supreme Court, in both Rochin and Schmerber, recog-
nized that the sanctity of the body is not absolute.45 In each opin-
ion, the Court impliedly acknowledged that the defendant's interest
in the sanctity of his body, as well as his interest in controlling the
presentation of and access to his body, may be required to yield
before society's interest in seeking and securing the evidence neces-
sary to prosecute criminal offenses against it.46
The same balancing process employed by the Supreme Court in
Rochin and Schmerber is embodied in the standards of review that
have evolved from these opinions. The interest of the defendant in
the sanctity of his body is controlling where a bodily intrusive search
"shocks the conscience" or where it constitutes a major intrusion in
terms of the extent of risk, trauma, and pain accompanying the
search.47 The interest of society in vigorous law enforcement is con-
trolling where the search constitutes a minor bodily intrusion.48 But
and privacy" and reaffirming "the integrity of an individual's person [as] a cherished
value of our society"); Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172, 174 (referring to "the struggle to open
his mouth and remove what was there, the forcible extraction of his stomach's
contents").
44 This conclusion is based on the recognition that virtually all courts considering the
question of surgical search, whether or not such searches are held reasonable or unrea-
sonable under the fourth amendment, characterize them as intrusive and occasionally as
invasive. See Lee II, 717 F.2d at 899, 901; Crowder, 543 F.2d at 316; Lee 1, 551 F. Supp. at
259-61; Bowden, 256 Ark. at 823, 510 S.W.2d at 881; Hughes, 429 A.2d at 1340; Doe, 409
So. 2d at 28; Creamer, 229 Ga. at 514, 192 S.E.2d at 353; Adams, 260 Ind. at 668, 299
N.E.2d at 837; Overstreet, 551 S.W.2d at 628; Lawson, 187 N.J. Super. at 29, 453 A.2d at
558; Bloom v. Starkey, 65 A.D.2d 763, 764, 409 N.Y.S.2d 773, 774 (1978); Smith, 80
Misc. 2d at 215, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 914; Allen, 277 S.C. at 602, 291 S.E.2d at 463.
45 See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768; Rochin, 342 U.S. at 171, 174.
46 See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768, 770-71; Rochin, 342 U.S. at 171, 174.
47 See supra notes 29, 33, 35 and accompanying text.
48 See supra notes 29, 34 and accompanying text. Virtually all of the surgical search
cases involve persons suspected of or prosecuted for serious criminal offenses. See
Crowder, 543 F.2d at 312 (defendant convicted of second degree murder, robbery, and
carrying dangerous weapon); Lee I, 551 F. Supp. at 248 (prosecution of defendant for
malicious wounding, attempted robbery, and use of firearm); Bowden, 256 Ark. at 821,
510 S.W.2d at 879 (defendant suspected of murder and robbery); Hughes, 429 A.2d at
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despite this similarity of philosophy between the Rochin and Schmer-
ber standards of review for bodily intrusive searches, the standards
are separate and distinct.
The "shocks the conscience" standard of Rochin focuses on the
improper methods employed to implement a bodily intrusive
search. In Rochin, an otherwise minor medical procedure, pumping
a stomach,49 is constitutionally invalid because of the impropriety of
the procedures utilized by law enforcement personnel to secure the
evidence.50 The Rochin standard for invalidating bodily intrusive
searches is thus a procedural standard.5' On the other hand, the
Schmerber minor intrusion standard goes beyond the law enforce-
ment procedures utilized in any given bodily intrusive search to an
examination of the medically assessed risk of such a search as de-
fined by the medical procedures involved.
52
It seems reasonable to suggest, on this analysis, that the Rochin
standard is primarily a legal standard, while the Schmerber standard is
a medico-legal one. The contours of the Schmerber standard can be
expected to shift on the basis of changes in either medical knowl-
edge of what constitutes major and minor bodily intrusions or in the
legal analysis of what constitutes reasonable and unreasonable bod-
ily intrusive searches. The contours of the Rochin standard, how-
ever, can be expected to shift only if there is a change in fourth
amendment search and seizure analysis.
55
The Rochin and Schmerber opinions constitute the foundation of
1339 (prosecution of defendant for murder and armed robbery); Doe, 409 So. 2d at 25
(defendant suspected of murder and attempted armed robbery); Creamer, 229 Ga. at 512,
192 S.E.2d at 351 (prosecution of defendant for double murder); Allison v. State, 129
Ga. App. 364, 364, 199 S.E.2d 587, 588 (1973) (defendant convicted of criminal at-
tempt to commit robbery by force), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1156 (1973); Adams, 260 Ind. at
664, 299 N.E.2d at 835 (defendant convicted of premeditated murder and felony mur-
der); State v. Martin, 404 So. 2d 960, 961 (La. 1981) (defendant indicted for second
degree murder of wife in domestic dispute); Richards, 585 S.W.2d at 505 (defendant
convicted of felony murder); Overstreet, 551 S.W.2d at 621 (defendant convicted of first
degree murder and first degree robbery); Lawson, 187 NJ. Super. at 26, 453 A.2d at 557
(defendant prosecuted for murder); Smith, 80 Misc. 2d at 211, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 910 (de-
fendant suspected of murdering police officer); Allen, 277 S.C. at 596, 291 S.E.2d at 459
(two defendants charged with murder and attempted armed robbery along with other
criminal offenses).
49 See generally DAVIS-CHRISTOPHER TExTBooK OF SURGERY (D. Sabiston 12th ed.
1981).
50 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
51 Rochin, 342 U.S. at 168-69, 172 (noting that due process clause of fourteenth
amendment imposes requirements on criminal procedure used by states and referring to
proceedings utilized to convict Rochin).
52 See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771-72 (noting that surgery was performed under proper
medical supervision).
53 See infra notes 63-120 and accompanying text.
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two distinct standards of review for addressing two distinct
problems raised by bodily intrusive searches: first, the constitution-
ality of the law enforcement procedures utilized to conduct such
searches; and second, the constitutionality of a specific bodily inva-
sion as determined by the medical procedures required for its per-
formance. And because Rochin and Schmerber are the only Supreme
Court decisions on the subject of bodily intrusive searches, 54 courts
considering the fourth amendment reasonableness of surgical
searches have invoked these opinions, fashioning them into stan-
dards of review. In the process, the original distinction between the
Rochin and Schmerber opinions-law enforcement procedure, on the
one hand, medical procedure, on the other-has faded.
This consequence is due to a shift in the perceived legal ques-
tion. For the Supreme Court in Rochin and Schmerber, the perceived
legal question was the constitutionality of involuntary bodily intru-
sions. 55 The nature of this question required the Court to scrutinize
both legal and medical procedures. In doing so, the Court applied
differing standards of review to procedural matters it viewed as dis-
tinct-legal procedures, on the one hand; medical procedures, on
the other.
For contemporary courts considering the reasonableness of
surgical searches, the perceived legal question has changed. The
issue has become the constitutionality of a specific type of bodily
intrusive search-the surgical search. Thus, a central focus of the
Schmerber Court, the reasonableness of medical procedures utilized
in bodily intrusive searches, has become paramount to courts con-
sidering the reasonableness of surgical searches. And of all the
medical procedures implicated in surgical searches, those related to
anesthesia receive the most attention. These courts have come to
view questions of anesthesia as central and, perhaps, dispositive of
the reasonableness of surgical searches. In this regard, the original
focus of Rochin, the constitutionality of procedures followed by law
enforcement personnel, has become less and less prominent.
Rochin, however, does retain vitality with respect to surgical search
cases because of its clear insistence that the dignity of the defend-
54 The United States Supreme Court has not reviewed the constitutionality of an-
other line of bodily intrusive searches, body cavity searches for contraband, usually illicit
drugs, conducted at U.S. ports of entry. See United States v. Shields, 453 F.2d 1235 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972); Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 703 (9th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 945 (1967).
55 Most cases involving surgical searches fall into the category of first impression.
Should a surgical search case come before the Supreme Court, it would be one of first
impression despite Rochin and Schmerber.
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ant's body merits constitutional recognition and protection.5 6
Courts considering the reasonableness of surgical searches
have converged in holding surgical searches reasonable when per-
formed with local anesthesia under the minor intrusion rationale of
Schmerber.57 By a similar convergence, surgical searches requiring
general anesthesia are held unreasonable because they violate the
"shocks the conscience" rationale of Rochin,58 because they consti-
tute major intrusions under Schmerber,59 or because they violate both
rationales. 6
0
This judicial consensus appears to be approaching promulga-
tion of a per se rule against those surgical searches requiring gen-
eral anesthesia.6 1 The most recent surgical search decision, Lee v.
Winston,62 supports this view.
III. LEE V. WINSTON: TOWARD A PER SE RULE PRECLUDING
GENERAL ANESTHETIC SURGICAL SEARCHES
A. DISTRICT COURT DECISION
The Lee case presented the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit with its first surgical search question. The defendant, Rudolph
Lee, was shot in the left side of his chest during the alleged perpe-
56 See Rochin, 342 U.S. at 174.
57 See Crowder, 543 F.2d at 316 (upholding as minor intrusion surgical search under
local anesthetic for bullet lodged in defendant's forearm but disallowing surgical search
for bullet lodged in thigh as major intrusion because of possibility of permanent injury);
Hughes, 429 A.2d at 1340 & n.2 (permitting as minor intrusion surgical search using local
anesthesia); Doe, 409 So. 2d at 28 (permitting as minor intrusion surgical search using
local anesthesia); Creamer, 229 Ga. at 514, 192 S.E.2d at 353 (permitting as minor intru-
sion surgical search using local anesthesia); Lawson, 187 N.J. Super. at 29, 453 A.2d at
557-58 (permitting as minor intrusion surgical search for bullet using local anesthesia);
Allen, 277 S.C. at 602-03, 291 S.E.2d at 463 (permitting surgical search performed
under local anesthesia as to first defendant as minor intrusion, but denying as major
intrusion surgical search of second defendant requiring general anesthesia and consid-
ered by two surgeons to be major surgical procedure). But see Crowder, 543 F.2d at 320-
24 (Robinson, J., dissenting).
58 See Lee I, 551 F. Supp. at 260; Smith, 80 Misc. 2d at 214, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 913.
59 See Bowden, 256 Ark. at 823-24, 510 S.W.2d at 881. See also Overstreet, 551 S.W.2d
at 626-28 (surgical search unreasonable under Schmerber-Crowder standard due in part to
absence of adversary hearing).
60 Lee II, 717 F.2d at 901 (finding proposed surgical search unreasonable under both
Schmerber ("[t]he proposed surgery is too intrusive and presents too great a risk") and
Rochin ("methods too close to the rack and screw to permit of constitutional
differentiation")).
61 The Supreme Court of Indiana has adopted a per se unreasonable rule against
both local and general anesthetic surgical searches. See Adams, 260 Ind. at 669, 299
N.E.2d at 838.
62 Lee v. Winston, 717 F.2d 888 (4th Cir. 1983) [Lee H], aff'g 551 F. Supp. 247 (E.D.
Va. 1982), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1906 (1984).
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tration of two felonies, attempted robbery and malicious wound-
ing.63 Subsequent to Lee's indictment for these crimes, the state
sought the surgical removal of the bullet lodged in his chest 64 for
possible use as evidence.
65
The federal district court initially granted the state's request for
the surgical search, applying the Schmerber standard of review and
finding that the state had complied with each element of the stand-
ard.66 The federal district court found that the proposed surgical
search, to be performed under local anesthetic, constituted a minor
intrusion with virtually no risk of harm. 67 Shortly after the opinion
ordering the surgical search was rendered, but prior to the surgical
search, Lee sought another hearing in federal district court concern-
ing the reasonableness of the search on the basis of changed
circumstances.
68
The changed circumstances concerned reassessment of the
medical procedures necessary to remove the bullet. A more thor-
ough medical evaluation indicated that surgical removal of the bul-
let would require general anesthesia.69 In its reassessment, the
district court noted that the surgery would entail a more substantial
medical undertaking. 70 Medical testimony indicated that the use of
general anesthesia also increased the risk of the proposed surgical
search to the defendant. 7 1 Upon consideration of the evidence sup-
porting Lee's assertion of changed circumstances, the district court
reversed its earlier decision and held the proposed surgical search
63 Lee v. Winston, 551 F. Supp. 247, 248 (E.D. Va. 1982) [Lee I], aff'd, 717 F.2d 888
(4th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1906 (1984).
64 Id. The state's motion to compel evidence was granted by the circuit court. The
Supreme Court of Virginia refused to grant either a writ of prohibition or a writ of
habeas corpus. Consequently, Lee sought relief in federal district court. Id. at 248-49.
65 Id. at 248, 252.
66 The federal district court applied the Schmerber standard as follows:
(1) there [is] a need for the evidence; (2) there [is] a clear indication the evidence
would be found; (3) the procedure [for securing the evidence is] a minor one with
"virtually no risk, trauma, or pain;" and (4) the procedure [is] reasonably carried
out in a hospital environment by medical personnel.
Id. at 251. See also supra note 29; Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-71.
67 Lee I, 551 F. Supp. at 251-52. Specifically, the court noted: (a) the bullet was
lodged superficially, 0.5 centimeters below the surface of the skin; (b) the examining
physician estimated the risk of harm associated with the removal of the bullet as "one in
10,000 or one in 100,000"; and (c) removal of the bullet could be accomplished under
local anesthetic. Id.
68 Id. at 253, 259.
69 Id. at 259.
70 The anticipated surgical incision was revised from 0.5 centimeters in depth by 1.5




unreasonable under the fourth amendment. 72
The most significant aspect of the district court's second opin-
ion was its abandonment of the Schmerber standard and adoption of
the Rochin standard in determining the reasonableness of a search
under the fourth amendment.73 Specifically, the court noted that
"the reasonableness of an intrusion turns on the degree and manner
of its interference with a person's privacy and dignity."'74 The court
invoked the language of Rochin, pointing out that "the fact that gen-
eral anesthetic is involved is very important to the Court's conclu-
sion that the procedures shock the conscience." 75
The district court, in adopting the Rochin standard as control-
ling, suggested that the medico-legal standard of Schmerber76 was not
the proper standard for assessing the fourth amendment reasona-
bleness of surgical searches. Judge Merhige stated that "whether or
not a surgeon would characterize the [surgical] procedure as 'minor
surgery' is of no moment; there is no reason to suppose that the
definition of a medical term of art should coincide with the parame-
ters of a constitutional standard."' 77 By rejecting Schmerber and
grounding its holding on the Rochin standard, the district court ap-
peared to be seeking a purely legal standard upon which to base its
decision that the proposed surgical search was unreasonable under
the fourth amendment.
72 Id. at 261.
73 Id. at 260-61.
74 Id. at 260.
75 Id. at 261.
76 See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
77 Lee I, 551 F. Supp. at 260. Judge Merhige came close to specifying the central flaw
of the major-minor distinction enunciated in Schmerber. The flaw is simply that the ex-
tent of the bodily intrusion in a surgical search does not vary necessarily or in practice
with the anesthesia employed. Thus, as outlined at supra note 21, major surgical proce-
dures, which surely are tantamount to major bodily intrusions, occur under local as well
as general anesthesia. Conversely, minor surgical procedures, viz. minor bodily intru-
sions, occur under general as well as local anesthesia.
These points illustrate the difficulty of framing a legal standard for surgical searches
on the basis of medical criteria. Courts passing on surgical search cases clearly are at-
tempting to limit such searches to minor bodily intrusions, viz. minor surgical proce-
dures. But they proceed to measure the miner nature of the intrusion by a medical
procedure-use of local rather than general anesthesia-that bears no necessary correla-
tion in theory or in practice to what the courts are trying to measure.
If general anesthesia is beyond the limit of reasonableness under the fourth amend-
ment, the authors suggest that it is because there is something in the nature of general
anesthesia that offends the value placed by our sociocultural system on the individual, a
value built into and protected by our legal establishment through the fourth amend-




The state appealed the second decision of the district court to
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. 78 The court of appeals,
in a split decision, affirmed the district court decision.
79
The appellate court's analysis of the fourth amendment reason-
ableness issue raised by the proposed surgical search illustrates the
difficulty a court encounters in deciding which standard, Rochin or
Schmerber, is controlling. Is a general anesthetic surgical search un-
reasonable because it constitutes major bodily intrusion, defined
principally by medical criteria, thereby contravening the Schmerber
minor intrusion standard? Or, is a general anesthetic surgical
search unreasonable, as the district court found, because rendering
a person, who is presumed innocent, unconscious against his will for
the purpose of probing into bodily tissues for evidence is a scenario
that "shocks the conscience" because it comes "too close to the rack
and screw" to pass constitutional muster under the Rochin stan-
dard?80 Reflective of this difficulty in determining exactly why a
general anesthetic surgical search is unreasonable, the appellate
court found both standards to have been violated.8 ' The problems
inherent in returning to the medico-legal standards of reasonable-
ness entailed in the Schmerber standard, however, were catalogued at
length by Judge Widener in his dissent.8
2
Judge Widener noted that characterization of surgery as major
78 Lee v. Winston, 717 F.2d 888, 890 (1983) [Lee II], cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1906
(1984).
79 Id. at 901.
80 See Lee 1, 551 F. Supp. at 261. In this regard, Judge Merhige of the district court
commented:
The Court is appalled at the prospect of government[al] authorities rendering a
person unconscious, cutting him open, and probing around inside his body for evi-
dence which might, or indeed might not, aid them in convicting him of a
crime .... The Commonwealth proposes to forcibly subdue petitioner by injec-
tion, make a substantial incision into his body, retract muscle tissue in an attempt to
locate the subject bullet, and if successful in locating it, extract it from his
body. . . . In short, "[t]hese are methods too close to the rack and screw to permit
of constitutional differentiation."
Id. (quoting Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172).
81 Lee 1I, 717 F.2d at 901. Thus, the majority noted, "[tihe task here, in assessing the
state's request to proceed with the surgery, is therefore to determine whether this is a
minor intrusion permissible under Schmerber or whether it is beyond the pale of permissi-
ble police intrusions and thus condemned by Rochin." Id. at 900. The majority con-
cluded: "'Considering the scope of the intrusion, the risks involved, and the affront to
petitioner's dignity,. . . the procedure contemplated is more akin to the impermissible
activity in Rochin than to the minor intrusion in Schmerber. "These are methods too close
to the rack and screw to permit of constitutional differentiation."' " Id. at 901 (quoting
Lee I, 551 F. Supp. at 261 (quoting in part Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172)).
82 See id. at 905-08 (Widener, J., dissenting).
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or minor is not to be determined solely by the use of general or
local anesthesia, but rather by the extent of the risk of harm to a
specific patient-defendant.8 3 Judge Widener demonstrated that as a
matter of fact, the risk factor of the Schmerber standard may be no
greater for this particular individual under general than under local
anesthesia. 8
4
The dissent demonstrated the artificial nature of defining major
and minor intrusions-unreasonable and reasonable surgical
searches-solely on the basis of general or local anesthesia, respec-
tively. If medical knowledge and technique are able to show as a
matter of fact that overall risk to a particular patient-defendant
under general anesthesia, on balance, is equal to or less than the
83 Id. at 905, 908 (Widener, J., dissenting). Judge Widener appears to be medically
correct in this regard. Whether or not an operation will proceed under local or general
anesthesia is not the determining factor in evaluating the potential risk of harm to the
patient. The evaluation depends upon "the careful investigation of the patient's physio-
logical status in order to delineate any deviations from the normal that may exist as a
result of disease. Pre-anesthetic evaluation begins with the review of the patient's medi-
cal history, physical examination findings, and laboratory data." See R. GRAY & L.
GORDY, supra note 21, at § 58.10. Risk associated specifically with the use of anesthesia
(as distinguished from risk associated with the surgical procedure itself) is correlated
positively with the physiological status of the patient. The healthier and, usually, the
younger the patient, the less risk of harm is associated with the use of anesthesia, local
or general. R. DaiPps,J. ECKENHOFF & L. VANDAm, supra note'21, at 14-15; R. GRAY & L.
GORDY, supra note 21, at § 58.13. See also Lee II, 717 F.2d at 906.
Medically, the risk of major or minor bodily intrusions resulting from major or mi-
nor surgery is an issue separate and distinct from the use of general or local anesthesia.
By attempting to correlate the extent of a surgical search with type of anesthesia, the
courts have tried to articulate a standard of reasonableness predicated upon medical
knowledge and practice while refusing to recognize that anesthesia and extent of bodily
intrusion are not related in any legally meaningful way. At the same time, a crucial issue
in surgical searches has been obscured. The issue is simply this: reasonableness in med-
ical terms is not reasonableness in legal terms; specifically, it is not reasonableness in
terms of the fourth amendment. Thus, the use of general anesthesia in conducting sur-
gical searches may be a major bodily intrusion. If it is, it is not because use of general
anesthesia represents a major bodily intrusion with all the attendant surgical risks. It is
because general anesthesia offends the dignity and privacy of the defendant's person.
See infra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
84 Citing the testimony of two surgeons, the dissent noted:
[Tihe proposed surgery would be less risky and involve fewer complications under
general anesthesia because it would proceed more smoothly. . . . [U]nder general
anesthesia the patient's muscles are more relaxed and the patient experiences less
pain. Under local anesthesia the muscles would contract when the patient felt pain,
making extraction of the bullet and any fragments more difficult. The relaxed state
of the patient's muscles under general anesthesia allows retraction of muscle tissue
and exposure of the bullet to be accomplished more easily: - . . 'anything that does
not have to be cut is not cut.'. . . [In addition,] the chances of the nerve being cut
were very small. . . [and] even smaller with general anesthesia because the relaxed
state of the muscle tissue allows the surgeon to see the nerves more clearly.
Lee II, 717 F.2d at 905-906 (Widener, J., dissenting) (quoting doctor's testimony).
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overall risk under local anesthesia,8 5 then the Schmerber standard
would be satisfied and the search would be reasonable.
This innocuous result can be avoided only if the issue is viewed
in different terms. Instead of examining the issue of the reasonable-
ness of the surgical search in terms of the comparative medical risks
between local and general anesthesia, it could be examined in terms
of the physical, indeed mental, invasion of a presumptively innocent
person. By examining the issue in this manner, a legal analysis em-
ploying a legal standard is required, rather than a Schmerber medico-
legal standard supported by an analysis predicated as much on cur-
rent medical state of the art as on legal standards and analyses.
Thus, where the question is one of rendering a presumptively inno-
cent person involuntarily unconscious in order to probe his body to
whatever depth necessary to secure a bullet that may or may not be
evidence at trial, the Rochin standard controls. Rochin controls be-
cause it is predicated upon certain American values embodied in our
Constitution. The prohibition against unreasonable search and
seizures as applied to surgical searches through the Rochin standard
recognizes that surgery performed under general anesthesia, no
matter how safe in Schmerber terms, on a presumptively innocent, in-
voluntarily unconscious person "shocks the conscience" of a free
society.
The fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures is eloquent testimony to the value accorded to
the person. The fourth amendment stands for the proposition that
in a free society, the prosecution of those alleged to have committed
criminal offenses must be satisfied by methods more consistent with
the value this country and its legal system places on the integrity of
the individual both in his body and his spirit. For two reasons, ren-
dering a defendant unconscious is not one of these methods. First,
insofar as consciousness-that is, an awareness of self and of one's
surroundings, the capacity to consider various courses of action and
to choose among them, the capacity to think, believe, feel, and
judge-is definitive of being human, the involuntary termination of
85 Drawing on testimony of an anesthesiologist, a professor emeritus of anesthesiol-
ogy, and a physician with extensive experience in the surgical removal of bullets, the
dissent pointed out that Lee was in the lowest risk category of persons who might re-
ceive general anesthetic. Id. at 907 (Widener,J., dissenting). The anesthesiologist testi-
fied that the risk of harm to Lee in surgically removing the bullet under local anesthetic
was one in 50,000. Id. (Widener, J., dissenting). But in further testimony, the anesthesi-
ologist stated that "for a given type of patient and surgery, assuming the involvement of
a competent anesthesiologist, the risk of injury, whether temporary or permanent, or of




consciousness by general anesthesia is a clear affront to the essence
of the defendant's humanity. Involuntary unconsciousness stands in
opposition to the value accorded to the physical and mental integ-
rity of the individual.
The second reason concerns privacy. Privacy stands as a senti-
nel to the physical and mental integrity of the individual. A domain
of privacy86 stands between the individual as a private person and
the individual as a public person sharing the world with others. It
serves as a reminder that the individual is something beyond his
membership in the social whole.
The fourth amendment recognizes this domain of privacy by
excluding from exposure to public view, through the actions of law
enforcement personnel, one's person, home, papers, and effects ab-
sent a public need to intrude conceptualized as probable cause.
8 7
The fourth amendment also protects areas of privacy based upon an
individual's expectation of privacy within such areas.88 If the fourth
amendment protects the privacy of the individual with respect to his
physical person, 9 to a sphere of private activity,90 and to zones of
privacy defined by an expectation of privacy,91 it surely protects the
privacy of his inner person. Thus, the fourth amendment protects
the inner physical and mental person from an involuntary surgical
invasion inducing a loss of consciousness-a general anesthetic sur-
gical search. This conclusion is supported by the fact that reason-
able searches under the fourth amendment typically are carried out
with the full awareness of the person subject to the search.92 Thus,
the person to be searched is aware of the manner by which the
86 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967); see also Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949).
87 For the text of the fourth amendment, see supra note 3.
88 See United States v. Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296, 3303 (1984) (monitoring of beeper in
private residence violates fourth amendment rights of those possessing justifiable inter-
est in privacy of the residence); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (justifi-
able reliance on expectation of privacy in phone booth renders wiretap search
unreasonable).
89 See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 92-93 (1979) (frisking procedure is serious in-
trusion on sanctity of person); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1968) (same holding as
in Ybarra).
90 See United States v. Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296, 3303 (1984) (private residence com-
prises sphere of private activity).
91 See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983) (expectation of private resi-
dence privacy does not extend to visual observation of automobile arriving on prem-
ises); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977) (warrantless search of lawfully
seized footlocker without probable cause to believe locker contained contraband violates
fourth amendment protection of legitimate expectations of privacy).
92 An exception is an authorized wiretap to search and seize certain of an individual's
personal, private oral communications. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
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search is conducted. Within this context, a general anesthetic surgi-
cal search is anomalous. It is a dual invasion of privacy not contem-
plated by the fourth amendment.
The individual who is surgically searched is not aware, nor can
he be, of the actual conduct of the search. He does not know, nor
can he know, whether or not the extent of the surgical intrusion has
become greater than he was told. He does not know, nor can he
know, whether or not the physical or mental surgical risk to him has
increased as the surgical search has progressed. Unlike other
searches, the general anesthesic surgical search entails an invasion
of a defendant's inner physical being as well as an invasion of the
definitive component of his mental being-his consciousness. 93
Such a dual affront to the individual would seem to be precluded by
the value accorded to that individual as guarded by a zone of privacy
recognized and protected by the fourth amendment.
The central issue is not, therefore, the extent of a surgical
search as a physical intrusion. Rather, the dispositive issue is the
manner in which the surgical search is conducted and its necessary
result-intrusion into both physical and mental zones of privacy.
Surgical searches conducted under general anesthesia, regardless of
whether the surgery contemplated constitutes a major or minor in-
trusion, offend the fourth amendment.
It is this analysis of the fourth amendment, compounded by
doubt about the probative value of the bullet and the presumption
of innocence, that Judge Merhige, presiding in the Lee trial court,
embraced when he found the proposed general anesthetic surgical
search unreasonable.9 4 It is against this same background that the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found the proposed surgical
search an " 'affront to petitioner's dignity.' "-5 It is, we suggest,
what the Supreme Court meant in its Rochin opinion when it stated
that certain invasions of the individual "shock the conscience," be-
ing "too close to the rack and screw to permit of constitutional
Another exception is the drawing of blood from an unconscious driver in order to deter-
mine its blood-alcohol content. See Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 435-36 (1957).
93 Local anesthetic surgical searches are somewhat analogous to the more typical
searches conducted pursuant to the fourth amendment. These searches do not involve
the dual personal invasion of general anesthetic searches. With local anesthetic
searches, the defendant is aware both of the proposed search and the actual conduct of
the search. There is an uncontroverted invasion of the defendant's physical being and,
hence, of his inner physical privacy. There is, however, no further invasion of his pri-
vacy. There is no attack on his mental privacy through a taking of his consciousness by
the administration of general anesthesia. See supra note 21. Compare notes 8-15.
94 See Lee I, 551 F. Supp. at 261.




The Lee majority's invocation of the Rochin standard in further
support of its decision, however, suggests a certain awareness that
the Schmerber standard alone could not support the use of general
anesthesia as the bright line separating reasonable from unreasona-
ble surgical searches. Perhaps this explains why the Lee majority did
not respond to the dissent's application of the Schmerber standard as
the reason for urging a factual finding that the proposed search
would be unreasonable. 9
7
An analysis of the Lee decision points up the dilemma of Schmer-
ber and the fourth amendment significance of Rochin. The minor in-
trusion of Schmerber is defined, in part, in terms of risk of harm. 98
The use of general anesthesia may constitute a major or minor in-
trusion and, hence, an unreasonable or a reasonable search, de-
pending upon the medical expertise available to control the risk of
harm. 99 But if the use of general anesthesia is construed as per se
violative of the integrity of the person, a construction clearly consis-
tent with the fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures, it would remain so regardless of risk of harm,
minimal though such risk may be from the medical point of view. 100
The Lee decision appears to have established, at least within the
Fourth Circuit, that use of general anesthesia constitutes the bright
line between reasonable and unreasonable surgical searches.' 0 ' In
support of its decision, the Lee majority invoked the Schmerber stand-
ard as the principal basis of its decision, 0 2 with reinforcement
96 Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172.
97 See Lee II, 717 F.2d at 905, 908 (Widener, J., dissenting).
98 See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771.
99 Anesthetic risk of harm has been minimized substantially in recent years by the use
of pre-anesthetic medication. See LAWYER'S MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 21, at
§ 25.16. The purpose of pre-anesthetic medication "is to induce sleep, alleviate appre-
hension, and produce some degree of reduction in metabolism, thereby reducing the
amount of other anesthetic drugs needed." Id. (emphasis supplied).
100 In this regard, the Lee majority agreed with the district court that a designation of a
surgical search as major or minor is not a medical issue but, rather, a legal one. See Lee II,
717 F.2d at 900-01. Thus, the majority noted that "a medical designation of this proce-
dure as minor surgery is not controlling. . . .The judicial inquiry is not to make the medical
estimate in medical terms, but is whether, under the totality of the circumstances presented,
the procedure proposed by the state is constitutionally unreasonable." Id. (emphasis supplied).
101 The dissent viewed the majority's opinion as going beyond establishing a bright
line separating reasonable and unreasonable searches. The dissent construed the opin-
ion as establishing a per se unreasonable rule against general anesthetic surgical
searches. Id. at 908 (Widener, J., dissenting).
102 The court found that "[t]he basic principle is that, once the state has demonstrated
the relevancy of evidence and the inability to obtain it otherwise, the reasonableness of
removing it forcibly from a person's body is judged by the extent of the surgical intru-
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drawn from the Rochin standard.'0 3 But as noted above, it is the
reliance on the Schmerber standard that weakens the Lee decision.'0 4
The Schmerber standard is a contingent standard- contingent upon
medical advances that may reduce the risk of harm associated with
general anesthesia such that the minor intrusion linchpin of the
standard is met. Any bright line constructed on a contingent stan-
dard is vulnerable to erosion.
The failure of the Lee majority to ground its decision on the
Rochin standard opens it to challenge as soon as prosecutors are
able to prove that the medical risk of general anesthesia is on a par
with that of local anesthesia generally, or at least with respect to a
particular suspect. Thus, if the Lee decision is to become the basis
for vindicating the value accorded by the fourth amendment to the
integrity of the person, two further steps are required. The first
step is an articulation of a per se rule that general anesthetic surgical
searches are unreasonable under the fourth amendment and the
Rochin rationale. The second step is an articulation of a rebuttable
presumption that local anesthetic surgical searches are per se unrea-
sonable based on Schmerber as expanded by United States v. Crowder.10 5
The integrity of the person remains a fourth amendment concern
even when a proposed surgical search is to be performed under lo-
cal anesthesia. Because local anesthetic surgeries are not necessar-
ily minimal bodily intrusions, the exact character of a proposed local
anesthetic surgical search merits greater scrutiny by the courts than
has been extended heretofore. 0 6
IV. PROPOSED RULES GOVERNING SURGICAL SEARCHES
A. GENERAL ANESTHETIC SURGICAL SEARCHES
This review of the surgical search cases indicates that courts
have determined fourth amendment reasonableness in terms of the
type of anesthesia, local or general, required to perform the
sion and the extent of the risks to the subject." Id. at 899. See also United States v.
Crowder, 543 F.2d 312, 316 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
103 Lee 11, 717 F.2d at 900-01.
104 See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
105 543 F.2d at 316.
106 [During the process of theJournal's publication of this Article, the Supreme Court
handed down a unanimous decision in Winston v. Lee. See Winston v. Lee, 53 U.S.L.W.
4367 (1985). The Court employed its Schmerber framework in balancing the disputed
medical risks to Lee and the intrusion on his privacy interests against the absence of a
compelling need on the part of the state to use the bullet as evidence. Id. at 4368-70.
The Supreme Court held the proposed search unreasonable under the fourth amend-
ment and affirmed the appellate decision. Id. at 4370.-ed.]
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search.10 7 No court to date has permitted a surgical search requir-
ing general anesthesia.' 08 Thus, a fair conclusion to draw is that the
courts have fashioned a de facto per se rule against general anesthe-
sia. This conclusion is warranted particularly in the Fourth Circuit
as a consequence of the Lee decision. 10 9
The rationale for the rule against the use of general anesthesia
in surgical searches is critical. The rationale chosen must be able to
resist such factual proof as would render a general anesthetic surgi-
cal search reasonable in the opinion of reviewing courts. Indeed, it
must be one that precludes general anesthetic surgical searches as a
matter of law rather than as a matter of fact. The Schmerber standard,
by tying the determination of reasonableness to medical technology,
renders a matter-of-fact rationale. 110 As such, it simply postpones
the time at which general anesthetic surgical searches, as a matter of
fact, become safe enough to fall on the minor intrusion side of the
major-minor dichotomy drawn by the Schmerber Court."'
The Supreme Court itself has resisted, on various occasions,
the efforts of appellate litigators to wed legal principles to matters of
fact resolved not by law, but rather by facts and their interpretation
drawn from nonlegal disciplines. 112 Where the Court has not re-
sisted these attempts, the outcome has been confusion over the in-
dependent validity of the resulting legal principles when new
evidence is later generated by nonlegal sources that can undermine
107 See Lee II, 717 F.2d at 900-01; Crowder, 543 F.2d at 313-17; Lee 1, 551 F. Supp. at
259-60; Bowden, 256 Ark. at 824, 510 S.W.2d at 881; Smith, 80 Misc. 2d at 215, 362
N.Y.S.2d at 911-12; Allen, 277 S.C. at 603, 291 S.E.2d at 462-63.
108 See Lee II, 717 F.2d at 899-901; Lee 1, 551 F. Supp. at 259-60; Bowden, 256 Ark. at
824, 510 S.W.2d at 881; Adams, 260 Ind. at 669, 299 N.E.2d at 838; Smith, 80 Misc. 2d at
215, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 914; Allen, 277 S.C. at 603, 291 S.E.2d at 463 (as to defendant
Childers). Conversely, where there is no other constitutional infirmity, courts have vali-
dated surgical searches that have been or would be performed under local anesthesia.
See, e.g., Crowder, 543 F.2d at 315; Doe, 409 So. 2d at 28; Creamer, 229 Ga. at 514-15, 192
S.E.2d at 352-53; Lawson, 187 N.J. Super. at 29-30, 453 A.2d at 558; Allen, 277 S.C. at
603, 291 S.E.2d at 463 (as to defendant Allen).
109 See Lee II, 717 F.2d at 908 (Widener, J., dissenting).
110 This conclusion is supported by the dissent in Lee. See id. (Widener, J., dissenting).
111 Id. (Widener, J., dissenting). See also R. DRIPPS, J. ECKENHOFF & L. VANDAM, supra
note 21, at 14-15; R. GRAY & L. GORDY, supra note 21, at § 58.13. Based on the standard
classification of physical status as an indicator of successful surgery promulgated by the
American Society of Anesthesiologists, general anesthetic surgical searches are safe
enough to be considered minor bodily intrusions where minor is defined in terms of
survival and full recovery. See R. DRIPPS, J. ECKENHOFF & L. VANDAM, supra note 21, at
14-15.
112 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204, 208-09 & n.22 (1976) (rejecting use of
statistical evidence by Oklahoma in support of differential drinking ages by sex). Justice
Brennan, for the Court, noted: "But this merely illustrates that proving broad sociologi-
cal propositions by statistics is a dubious business and one that inevitably is in tension
with the normative philosophy of the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 204.
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the very legal principles that such evidence originally was used to
establish.' '1
Illustrative of this tension between legal principles and the
threat of their erosion by nonlegal evidence are the Court's deci-
sions in the area of abortion. 114 As Justice O'Connor pointedly
noted in her dissent in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health,115 medical knowledge and technology have destroyed the
two standards established in Roe v. Wade 16 that define the pregnant
woman's unfettered substantive due process right to make an abor-
tion decision. This result is possible because the right established in
Roe v. Wade is, in actuality, founded less upon substantive due pro-
cess jurisprudence than it is upon the capacity of medical technol-
ogy to relocate the point of fetal viability earlier into pregnancy." 
7
113 See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 103 S. Ct. 2481
(1983) (invalidating locally imposed restrictions on abortion). Justice O'Connor, in dis-
sent, took issue with the majority's reliance on constantly revised medical standards and
noted, "it is clear that the trimester approach violates the fundamental aspiration of
judicial decision making through the application of neutral principles 'sufficiently abso-
lute to give them roots throughout the community and continuity over significant peri-
ods of time. .. ' " 103 S. Ct. at 2507 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting A. Cox, THE
ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 114 (1976)) (elipsis in
original).
114 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 148-49 (1973). See also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297, 312-18 (1980); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 642 (1979); Colautti v. Franklin, 439
U.S. 379, 392-94 (1979); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 472-75 (1977); Beal v. Doe, 432
U.S. 438, 445-46 (1977); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 63-
65 (1976).
115 103 S. Ct. at 2505-07 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
116 410 U.S. at 164. In articulating the woman's right to make an abortion decision,
the Court stated: "For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester,
the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the
pregnant woman's attending physician." Id. at 164. Thus, even the recognition of the
constitutional right to make an abortion decision is predicated as much on the judgment
of physicians, a judgment itself grounded in prevailing medical knowledge and technol-
ogy, as it is on constitutional principles of substantive due process. Justice O'Connor
elaborated on this point in her dissent in Akron Center for Reproductive Health:
The Roe framework, then, is clearly on a collision course with itself. As the
medical risks of various abortion procedures decrease, the point at which the State
may regulate for reasons of maternal health is moved further forward to actual
childbirth. As medical science becomes better able to provide for the separate
existence of the fetus, the point of viability is moved further back toward concep-
tion. . . . The Roe framework is inherently tied to the state of medical technology
that exists whenever particular litigation ensues.
103 S. Ct. at 2507 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
117 See Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 103 S. Ct. at 2507 (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing); Danforth, 428 U.S. at 64; Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-65. Thus, the fourteenth amend-
ment's substantive due process right to privacy, which permits and protects a woman's
abortion decision, is a contingent right. It is contingent not upon the legally derived
constitutional meaning of the right to privacy, but rather upon two inherently contradic-
tory lines of medical expertise and technology. One line of medical authority has made
abortions safe into the second trimester, see Akron Centerfor Reproductive Health, 103 S. Ct.
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The promulgation of dependent legal principles-principles
built with one foot in the law and one foot in medicine, the social
sciences, engineering, or some other nonlegal domain-generates
uncertainty and confusion. Legal principles and their measuring
standards ought to change primarily as a consequence of the need
to apply them to changed circumstances, arising within the sociocul-
tural system and presented to the courts by the vehicle of litigation.
As mediator of litigious disputes precipitated by extralegal changes,
the judiciary proceeds by applying principles and standards in-
dependent of the factual positions it must adjudicate. The law, as
promulgated by the judiciary, is accepted and implemented because
it is derived from legal principles and standards, rather than from a
skillful but partisan edifice of legal principles and standards gener-
ated by legal advocates to reflect the most recent nonlegal state of
knowledge or of art.
The significance of independent legal resolutions to legal issues
seems clear. As applied to surgical search cases, general anesthetic
surgical searches are unreasonable on the basis of legal principles
and standards, rather than on the basis of contemporary or antici-
pated medical knowledge and technology. Regardless of how safe
such searches are or come to be, the fact that presumptively inno-
cent persons can be rendered involuntarily unconscious to undergo
surgery that will facilitate the government's search for evidence, the
probative value of which remains to be determined definitively, will
not cease to breach the integrity of the person, offending the fourth
amendment per se and the principles of liberty upon which the
fourth amendment is based. The Rochin Standard is a defensible,
independent constitutional rationale that is available to support
conversion of the prevailing de facto per se rule against general an-
esthetic surgical searches into a de jure per se rule.
B. LOCAL ANESTHETIC SURGICAL SEARCHES
Local anesthetic surgical searches are not free from concern re-
garding their reasonableness under the fourth amendment. The
Crowder test,"18 which builds upon the Schmerber standard and has
at 2496, thus expanding the right. The other line of medical authority has established
an earlier point of fetal viability, see id. at 2507 & n.5 (O'Connor,J., dissenting), thereby
simultaneously contracting the right just expanded by a sister branch of the medical
profession.
118 See Crowder, 543 F.2d at 316. The court in Crowder enunciated the following test:
(1) The evidence sought [is] relevant, could [be] obtained in no other way, and
there [is] probable cause to believe that the operation would produce it; (2) the
operation [is] minor, [is] performed by a skilled surgeon, and every possible precau-
tion [is] taken to guard against any surgical complications, so that the risk of perma-
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been utilized as the basis of decisions in subsequent surgical search
cases," l9 indicates a commitment by the courts to closely scrutinize
local anesthetic surgical searches. Because involuntary local anes-
thetic surgery raises some of the same problems as involuntary gen-
eral anesthetic surgery-bodily intrusions performed on
presumptively innocent persons-similar attention to fourth amend-
ment safeguards appears warranted. To this end, the following revi-
sions of the Schmerber-Crowder test are suggested:
1. Establishment of a rebuttable presumption against the reasonable-
ness of local anesthetic surgical searches;
2. The presumption may be rebutted in an adversarial hearing where
the accused is represented by counsel;
3. The bullet sought by the state must constitute necessary, not sim-
ply relevant, evidence for the prosecution of the accused;
4. The definitive element of the minor nature of the surgical search is
that the bullet must be subject to safe removal under the local infiltra-
tion use of local anesthesia;
5. Once the prosecution establishes that the surgical search can be
performed safely under local infiltration local anesthesia, the burden
remains upon the prosecution to satisfy the court that there is no risk
of harm to the accused from the surgery itself; and
6. If the state is able to rebut the presumption, appellate review shall
be afforded to the accused prior to execution of the surgical search. 120
nent injury [is] minimal; (3) before the operation [is] performed the [trial] court
[holds] an advers[arial] hearing at which the defendant appear[s] with counsel;
[and] (4) thereafter and before the operation [is] performed the defendant [is] af-
forded an opportunity for appellate review.
Id.
119 See Martin, 404 So. 2d at 962; Richards, 585 S.W.2d at 506; Overstreet, 551 S.W.2d
at 626-28; Lawson, 187 NJ. Super. at 29-30, 453 A.2d at 558.
120 The first element of the revised Schmerber-Crowder test is new. The third element
constitutes a change in the test by requiring that the bullet being sought as evidence
bear a greater probative value-that it be necessary to the state's case-than has been the
case to date.
The change suggested in the fourth element of the test is the most significant. It
specifically precludes surgical removal of a bullet under regional local anesthesia. See
supra note 21.
Major surgical procedures in terms of the extent of bodily intrusion and associated
surgical risks are performed under local anesthesia employed in a regional capacity.
Thus, only local infiltration local anesthesia (local anesthesia applied by injection to the
peripheral nerves of a delimited surgical site) would be permitted under the revision
being suggested. See LAWvER'S MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 21, at § 25.28. Under
local infiltration local anesthesia, not only is the affected area of the body relatively small
but the surgeries to be performed are limited to minor procedures involving only a su-
perficial penetration of bodily tissue. See id.; R. DRIPPS, J. ECKENHOFF & L. VANDAM,
supra note 21, at 242.
It should be noted that without direct acknowledgement, the courts hearing surgical
search cases have permitted only such surgical searches as are performed under local
infiltration local anesthesia. See Crowder, 543 F.2d at 313-15; Hghes, 429 A.2d at 1340;
Doe, 409 So. 2d at 28; Creamer, 229 Ga. at 514-15, 192 S.E.2d at 352; Allison, 129 Ga.
App. at 365, 199 S.E.2d at 588-89; Allen, 277 S.C. at 603, 291 S.E.2d at 463. But by
[Vol. 75550
SURGICAL SEARCH
The application of a more stringent test to proposed local anes-
thetic surgical searches will accord paramount importance to the
value placed by the American sociocultural system, and the fourth
amendment of the Constitution, on the physical and mental integ-
rity of the person. It also recognizes the interest of society in taking
effective action against the perpetrators of crime. The suggested re-
vision of the Schmerber-Crowder test strikes a defensible balance be-
tween these two competing interests central to a free society. It
places a more substantial burden of proof on the state than does the
current Schmerber-Crowder test, thereby protecting the personhood of
the accused. Yet it clearly acknowledges that the burdens imposed
on the state can be sustained, thereby insuring that the interests of
society in safety and protection from crime will be served.
V. CONCLUSION
Surgical searches, conducted under either local or general an-
esthesia, are inimical to values central to this country and made
manifest in its legal institution through the Constitution. Fostering
these values while protecting others requires a revision of the pre-
vailing rules governing both types of surgical searches. 12 1
This Article has proposed two such revisions. With respect to
general anesthetic surgical searches, it has argued that these
searches are per se unreasonable under the fourth amendment and
has suggested adoption of a de jure per se rule against such
searches. With respect to local anesthetic surgical searches, this Ar-
ticle has suggested that a rebuttable presumption of unreasonable-
making this fact a criteria of the Schmerber-Crowder test, it will be easier to avoid any
possible drift into the more extensive surgical searches that clearly can be performed
under local anesthesia. See, e.g., Richards, 585 S.W.2d at 506 (affirming surgical search
for bullet lodged in defendant's hip four inches below surface of skin); Lawson, 187 NJ.
Super. at 29-30, 453 A.2d at 558 (affirming surgical search for bullet located in defend-
ant's thigh three-quarters to one inch below surface of skin).
121 These proposed rules hold significant practical consequences. First, they would
simplify the decisionmaking process regarding surgical searches under either local or
general anesthesia. Where expert medical testimony indicates that a surgical search can
be conducted under a local infiltration use of local anesthesia, the decisionmaking proc-
ess proceeds according to the revised Schmerber-Crowder test. See supra note 120 and ac-
companying text. Where expert medical testimony indicates that a surgical search
requires general anesthesia or regional use of local anesthesia, the inquiry is immedi-
ately and effectively terminated. Because the process of decision is simplified, the
amount of judicial time allocated to ruling on motions to compel evidence would be
minimized. Furthermore, under the rules proposed by this Article, the fourth amend-
ment analysis and determination of any proposed surgical search will be the same in all
courts regardless of the circumstances of the case beyond the type of anesthesia to be
used and its mode of induction.
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ness be established along with adoption of stricter standards for
rebutting the presumption.
